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European Security and Defense Policy Under the Gun
Jeff P. H. Cazeau*
I. Introduction
In the wake of a growing awareness of their dependency on the
United States during the NATO campaign in Kosovo, leaders in Europe
vowed to create a European arm within NATO. In May 1999, Tony
Blair, the British Prime Minister announced, "We Europeans should not
expect the United States to play a role in every disorder in our back
yard."1 Meeting in Bremen, Northern Germany, defense and foreign
ministers of the long dormant Western European Union (WEU)
announced that they were committed to developing "an effective
European defense and security policy."
2
The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) refers to the
process of building that effective European defense and security policy.
It sprang from an idea to develop "a rapid-reaction corps which would
act at the EU's behest in crises that were too big to ignore but not big
enough to demand the involvement of America, and therefore of
NATO."3 Proponents of the process claim that the goal of ESDP is to
streamline and coordinate European military policies that now duplicate
one another, and to strengthen the European "pillar" within NATO.4
Some critics, such as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
say that the move towards a European defense force is part of a "utopian
venture" to create a single super state to rival the United States.5
Lady Thatcher claims that the venture had long been a French
aspiration.6 She argues that the idea of Europe being more active in its
defense superficially sounded "splendid" but the impulse toward
developing a new European defense and separate armed forces has little
* (J.D.) University of Miami School of Law, 2002.
1 Roger Cohen, Europeans Commit to a Common Defense Policy, DESERT
NEws, May 12, 1999, at A5.
2 id.
3 The EU Turns its Attention From Ploughshares to Swords, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 18, 1999.4 id.
5 Chris Gray, Thatcher Dismisses Utopian 'Euro Army', BIRMINGHAM REPORT,
Dec. 8, 1999, at 8.6 id.
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to do with reality, when Europe was cutting its defense budget and
America was increasing theirs.7
As Britain's Prime Minister for three terms, Lady Thatcher
bitterly opposed Britain integration into Europe.8 She saw a British role
in the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to the EU,
as having the potential to threaten the unique relationship that Britain had
cultivated with its Anglophone ally across the Atlantic.9 Due to the chilly
relationship that existed between Lady Thatcher and French President
Mitterand, it is wise to take her criticisms of the French with a grain of
salt.10
It is important to note, however, that the French (along with the
Germans) have for a long time been the standard-bearer for a Europe-
only defense."" It was after all French Foreign Minister Claude
Cheysson, at President Mitterand's suggestion, who recommended the
reactivation of the long dormant Western European Union (WEU) in
1984 that under the original formulation for a European Defense was to
be the European arm of NATO.12 Lady Thatcher and others saw France's
championing of the WEU as one of France's perennial attempts to
counter what they believed was increasing American hegemony.1 3 Many
today see ESDP as continuing that tradition.
At the EU's Nice summit in December 2000, French President
Jacques Chirac, stated that Europe was creating an "independent"
defense. 4 Most recently, while discussing ESDP, the German Defense
7id.
8 See PETER RIDDELL, THE THATCHERDECADE 192 (Basil Blackwell 1989).
9 See id. at 186-92.
1o See P.M.H. BELL, FRANCE AND BRITAIN 1940-1994: THE LONG SEPARATION
246-47 (Longman 1997).
11 See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 3.
12 See Cheryl Swack, Building a Bridge for Defense: The European Union's
Common Foreign and Security Policy, 6 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L. L., 1, 20
(1997/1998).
13 "Jacques Chirac, recently summed up the U.S.-French relationship in this
way: 'Franco American relations have been, and always be, both conflictual and
excellent. The U.S. finds France unbearable with its pretensions; we find the
U.S. unbearable with its hegemonism. But deep down, we remember that the
"boys" came to help us two times, just as the Americans remember that the
French helped them with their independence. So there will be sparks but no fire,
because a real bond exists."' Olin Robison, Francois Mitterand (Vermont
Public Radio Broadcast, Jan. 12, 1995).
14 See John Vinocur, EU Defense Autonomy Lacks a Unifying Voice, INT'L
HERALD TRB., Apr. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4853624.
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Minister Rudolf Scharping, told the defense commission of the French
National Assembly that, "we don't want an unnecessary duplication of
capabilities and no competition between NATO and the EU that is
damaging to Euro-Atlantic relations."' s Paul Quiles, The French defense
commission's president asked, "But why not useful duplication?" In a
preemptive response to German concerns about transatlantic decoupling,
he said: "There's such a thing as a danger of over coupling. That's in the
American's missile defense idea. In every respect, it just isn't reasonable
to let the Americans confiscate all responsibility, military and
political. ' 6
It is clear that, at least for some, there may be validity to the fears
that ESDP will ultimately be the lever that Europe uses to get from under
the perceived thumb of the U.S. Despite the indications as to the ultimate
purpose of a greater European defense posture, the U.S. has, at least
officially, adopted the view that it does not object to the ESDP concept.
In fact, after years of arguing that Europe was not shouldering its fair
share of maintaining the Atlantic alliance, Washington welcomes the
prospect of increased defense spending by its allies. Recently, President
Bush affirmed that, in general, the U.S. views ESDP favorably. "The
United States", he said, "welcomes the European Union's European
Security and Defense Policy, intended to make Europe a stronger, more
capable partner in deterring and managing crises affecting the security of
the transatlantic community. 17 Despite such positive comments, it is
clear that at least some in the administration have their reservations.
Colin Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State has said:
We welcome a more integrated, robust and stronger Europe...
Our allies are in the midst of important efforts to improve their
defense capabilities. We will support any such efforts as long
as it strengthens NATO, not weakens it... We do not say that
there are no differences between the plethora of people who
have thought it right to express a view.18
One of the "views" hinted at by Secretary Powell is that ESDP will
duplicate or degrade NATO's ability to carry out its mission.
With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw
Pact the probability of an armed attack by a belligerent nation, on the
15 Id.
16 id.
17 CFSP, Getting EU Citizens out ofDanger, EUR. REP., May 9, 2001.
18 Id.
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scale envisioned by NATO during the cold war, is very unlikely.
Regardless, the NATO Treaty still governs how the allies will react when
confronted with an attack on one or some of its members. Article V of
the Washington Treaty that created NATO, makes it clear that the
Alliance's primary purpose is collective defense and that an "armed
attack against one or more [of NATO members] shall be considered an
attack against them all."' 9 ESDP should not and cannot duplicate or
degrade NATO's ability to carry out this mission.
Unfortunately, all indications are that ESDP will in fact degrade
and duplicate NATO functions. Despite the growing impetus behind
ESDP, and the modest increases in defense spending that some members
have undertaken, it still remains to be seen whether the European allies
will carry out the long-term increases in defense spending that would be
needed to duplicate the intelligence and logistical support that the U.S.
currently provides NATO.20 Secondly, if ESDP will be, as the Europeans
have said Europe's arm within NATO, and if ESDP will not or cannot
act in the NATO area without violating or coming to a head with the
NATO treaty, then Europe's troops tied to ESDP will only be able to
operate outside of the NATO area. Events in recent years have shown
that in the future regional organizations will be increasingly called on to
take part in the resolution of crises that have arisen in places like
Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, Liberia and elsewhere. The out of area missions
that ESDP will most likely undertake are, therefore, likely to be
humanitarian interventions. Despite the many opinions to the contrary it
is still not clear even after Kosovo, that the U.N. Charter authorizes
unilateral humanitarian interventions. And as long as the question is
unsettled it is possible that the most likely mission for ESDP will be
illegal under international law and the U.N. Charter.
Part II of this note will examine the United States' first difficulty
19Article V reads: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them,
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties,
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of aimed force, to restore
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, Stat. 2241, 2244 34 U.N.T.S. 243,
246.
20 See generally John C. Hulsman, A Grand Bargain with Europe: Preserving
NA TO for the 21 ' Century, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 71 (2000).
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with ESDP: that in the short term ESDP will degrade NATO and its
ability to defend Europe and that it will duplicate and degrade NATO
capabilities. This argument is based on the fact that Europe's spending
on defense has never been up to par, and that the modest increases in
defense spending announced by some of the European allies will not
close the gap between the U.S.' defense spending and Europe's. I will
argue that at least one of the allies, Germany, currently lacks both the
fiscal ability and the political will to increase its defense expenditures,
and that without more money and more assets, the ESDP will have to
draw its strength and assets from those already dedicated to NATO,
thereby, effectively duplicating and degrading NATO's capabilities
precisely in the way that the U.S. objects.
In Part Im, I argue that before the final shape of ESDP can be
finalized the question of the legality of unilateral humanitarian
intervention in the absence of Security Council approval must be
answered. I will argue that under current international law and the U.N.
Charter, humanitarian intervention, absent Security Council, approval is
illegal. Therefore, the primary mission that ESDP contemplates, namely
humanitarian interventions outside the NATO area, are illegal.
II. ESDP Will Degrade NATO's Ability to Complete Its Primary
Mission.
The United States does not object to the building of a European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). To do so would be disingenuous
and would ignore the years of rhetoric that has come out of Washington,
urging the Europeans to increase or improve their defense forces.
21
When it comes to the ESDP the primary concern of the U.S. is
that it does not become a replacement for NATO. That ESDP should not
duplicate NATO's function. Nor should it draw on NATO capabilities or,
most importantly, be used over NATO's objection or withdraw forces
from NATO without NATO's authority.22 Unfortunately, it is very likely
that absent some drastic measures, Europe will not likely increase its
21 In a speech to a gathering of Germany's top brass last December, William
Cohen, the American Defense secretary, called for a "complete reorientation" of
the country's armed forces, including "a radical reduction and restructuring of
an outmoded and oversized main defense force." Guns or Butter?, THE
ECONOMIST, May 13, 2000, at 50.
22 See THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 1999, supra note 3.
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spending on defense, nor will it increase its manpower to the point where
a defense force, separate from NATO will be possible.23
The three big countries that would lead the European rapid
reaction force of 60,000 men, now contemplated under ESDP are France,
Britain and Germany. Altogether, EU members spend roughly 60% of
the American total but have barely 10% of America's ability to deploy
and maintain military over long distances.24 Two of the wealthiest
European Allies, France and Britain, together spend approximately 80
billion dollars on defense spending or 2.8% of their GDP's each, in
contrast to the United States' 3.2%.25 Both France and Britain appear to
have the political willpower and the fiscal resolve to meet the cost
requirements that a militarily stronger Europe through ESDP would
entail. The same cannot be said about Germany, however.
France is determined to "reform the alliance structure in order to
make for greater balance between its American leadership and European
participants. 2 6 "Under the French defense plan, it hopes to have at least
30,000 troops able to be rapidly deployed, as well as 100 deployable
combat aircraft, two time France's Persian Gulf levels."
27
Britain has also made significant progress towards reforming its
armed forces and making modest increases to defense spending. After
Kosovo, Prime Minister Blair became increasingly convinced that
Europe's diplomatic weakness was linked to its inadequate military
capabilities.28 Prime Minister Blair broke with British tradition in
advocating much closer ties between the countries comprising the
European pillar of NATO. 29 Along with President Chirac, he has argued
that Europe should be more involved in its own defense. "As Peter
Mendelson, Blair's closest political confidant, put it, 'Should US
taxpayers and U.S. troops always have to resolve any problems that exist
on Europe's doorstep?"' 30 To back up its talk, the UK moved to an all
volunteer professional military. To increase their lift capabilities, the
British are planning to lease four C-17s from the U.S.31 Furthermore,
23 See Vinocur, supra note 14.
24 See Defending the Union, THE ECONOMIST, June 5, 2001, at 17.
25 See Hulsman, supra note 20, at 73.26 Id. at 79.
27[8"
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"[to enhance strategic sea lift for the deployment of forces, the British
government plans to acquire six roll-on-roll off ships.3 2
In Germany, there has been much talk in favor of European
integration on the widest possible scale but it does not appear that the
country is prepared either politically or otherwise to accept the fiscal
burden of ESDP. As Major J.D. Godwin points out in his article
examining NATO's role after the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts33 it is
unclear that Germany will permit its armed forces to participate in
NATO operations other than for collective self defense. It is even more
unclear whether Germany will have the political willpower to participate
in those activities as part of a European Defense initiative in areas where
there is still lingering hostility over Germany's occupation during
WvnWXI.34
While President Chirac of France and Prime Minister Blair of the
UK aspire to a significant improvement in Europe's defense standing,
recent trends indicate that German defense spending will continue to
decrease in the coming years.35 Germany is the biggest and richest West
European country, but spends only 1.5% of its GDP on defense.36 In May
2000 Chancellor Gerhard Schroder admitted that Germany's armed
forces were "no longer completely NATO-ready" nor could they meet
the challenges that participation in a new European force would
require.37 Still, Shroder refused to set aside any more funds for defense.
In fact, as Shroder was making these comments in May 2000, the
German government had already cut defense spending by 3.6% and was
planning further cuts.
38
Without increased spending by the Europeans they will be
incapable of operating alone under ESDP. The idea of ESDP developed
in the aftermath of NATO's foray into Kosovo. The European Allies
were reportedly "shamed by their modest contribution to [the] war over
Kosovo and by the time it took most of them to get their troops there to
keep the subsequent peace., 39 Kosovo revealed a huge disparity between
U.S. military and European military capabilities, and put the alliance on
32 id.
33 See generally Major J.D. Goodwin, NATO's Role in Peace Operations:
Reexamining the Treaty After Bosnia and Kosovo, 160 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1999).341Id. at 13.
35 See Hulsman, supra note 20, at 80.
36 See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 21, at 51.
37 id.
38 1rd.
39In Defense of Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 2000, at 25.
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notice it was in urgent need of reform. During the conflict ,"U.S.
intelligence assets identified almost all the bombing targets in Serbia and
Kosovo, US aircraft flew two-thirds of the strike missions, and nearly
every precision-guided missile was launched from an American
aircraft." 40 The Europeans simply lacked the computerized weapons,
night-vision equipment, and advanced communications that the
American's possessed. Most importantly the Europeans discovered that
they lacked "lift:" capabilities or the ability to transport an army at will.
42
The U.S.' monopoly on lift capability is what accounts for the U.S.'
current military dominance. 43 Europeans found that they, "are not only
very limited in the amount of force they can project beyond Europe, but
they must also depend heavily on the US in more nearby places like the
Balkans."
As American General John Sheehan, former Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) put it, "The technological gap is
increasing between the U.S. and Europe. Soon the other members of
NATO will be little more than constabulary forces, with the US
possessing the only genuine modem army.""5 German General Klaus
Naumann, retired Chairman of NATO's military committee put it
another way when he expressed the view that the day is fast approaching
when the U.S. and its European allies, "will not even be able to fight on
the same battlefield.0
6
German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping has said that, "We
don't want an unnecessary duplication of capabilities and no competition
between NATO and the EU that is damaging to Euro-Atlantic
relations. ' 4 Both the French and the British have recently echoed those
sentiments. But, given all the capabilities that the U.S. provides to
NATO, surely as the Europeans embark on the creation of their separate
defense mechanism, duplication and degradation of NATO's capabilities
will occur.
The United States wishes to maintain, strengthen and expand
NATO so that it continues to be a strong and viable multinational
security alliance, whose consultative machinery, provided, for in Art. 5
40 Hulsman, supra note 20, at 71.
41Id.




46 Hulsman, supra note 20, at 71.
47 Vinocur, supra note 14.
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of the Treaty, fosters cooperation among member states, creating a
necessary forum for solving international security issues as they arise.4
As long as the U.S. continues to contribute more than its fair
share to NATO it will continue to have the greatest say in the Alliance.
Europe must act cautiously and fairly towards the U.S. It will be many
years before Europe achieves the autonomy it desires and as the
Economist cautioned in 1999, "Get all these details right early on and
Europe's emerging defense identity and military capability will
strengthen NATO to the benefit of security all round. Get them wrong,
and the damage will be just as far-reaching. '49
m. The Most Likely Mission for ESDP, Humanitarian
Intervention, is Illegal Under International Law and the
U.N. Charter.
Even if the European allies are able to create a force separate
from NATO that is in fact the European pillar in the NATO structure,
any action by that force in the NATO area will violate the NATO Treaty.
Arguably, any action outside the area by European forces utilizing
NATO assets will require the full approval of all NATO members
leaving ESDP only able to act in situations that meet two requirements:
1) NATO is unable or unwilling to act 2) the U.S. and Canada approve of
the mission, but simply do not wish to participate.
Presumably, any such a scenario is also almost inevitably a
matter on which the U.N. Security Council is unable or willing to act
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter which governs "Action with
respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression". 0 Over the last few decades the instances where military
actions have met one or more of the above criteria have been in the area
of humanitarian interventions.
Such prominent international law authorities as Professors Louis
Henldn and Oscar Schachter have argued that humanitarian interventions
are illegal under the U.N. Charter and customary international law.51
As Professor Henkin points out, "before the Second World War,
48 See Swack, supra note 12, at 8.
49 THE ECoNoMIsT, supra note 39, at 26.
o U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
51 See Louis Henkin, Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention:
Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 93 A.M. J. INT'L. L. 824
(1999). See also Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Forces, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984).
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international law prohibited 'intervention' by any state within the
territory of another without that state's consent: international law
prohibited unilateral intervention in internal wars; international law
prohibited intervention ever for agreed, urgent humanitarian purposes. 52
The U.N. Charter's general prohibition against all forms of armed
aggression is a reaffirmation of this idea. 3 Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter reads: "All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations. ' 4
Some have argued that humanitarian interventions are a broad
exception to this provision. In Henkin's view, "unilateral intervention,
even for what the intervening state deems to be important humanitarian
ends, is and should remain unlawful.,1 6 Henkin's chief argument is that
the nations most likely to engage in humanitarian intervention are also
the richest, and often have other political motives behind their actions
making humanitarian intervention very susceptible to abuse.
Those who believe in humanitarian intervention often argue that
there are safeguards against abuse. The first being the U.N. Charter,
which requires Security Council authorization for any intervention. The
second is that actions by NATO or other regional organizations, being a
collection of states, are less likely to be subject to abuse.
NATO did not seek explicit authorization from the Security
Council during the Kosovo campaign because even after the Cold War,
unanimity by the permanent members of the Security Council is not
assured. NATO apparently decided that it would be better not to risk
having its military action vetoed. After all, there was serious conflict, a
threat to international peace and security in its own backyard involving
claims of atrocities and genocide.
Morality aside, NATO's actions were still arguably illegal under
the U.N. Charter. The Charter prohibition against intervention, even for
humanitarian purposes, applies to individual states as well as groups of
states that act unilaterally. 7 The Security Council's ratification of
NATO's action through Resolution 1244 was contrary to the procedure
set out by the U.N. Charter whereby states are prohibited from
52 Henkin, supra note 51, at 824.
53 rd.
54 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.55 See Henkin, supra note 51, at 825.56 Id. at 824.
57 See Henkin, supra note 51, at 826.
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intervention of any kind including humanitarian, unless first authorized
by the Security Council.
By ratifying NATO's actions after the fact, the Security Council
may have created a questionable precedent whereby a state or group of
states can engage in a "humanitarian" intervention, confident that the
Security Council will later acquiesce and ratify their military action. This
precedence is clearly in conflict with Article 2(4) of the Charter
prohibiting "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state" (subject only to the right of self-
defense, Article 51).58
In 1991, Professor Oscar Schacter argued against the legitimacy
of NATO's actions:
Even in the absence of such prior approval, a State or group of
States using force to put an end to atrocities when the
necessity is evident and the humanitarian intention is clear is
likely to have its action pardoned. But, I believe it is highly
undesirable to have a new rule allowing humanitarian
intervention, for that could provide a pretext for abusive
intervention. It would be better to acquiesce in a violation that
is considered necessary and desirable in the particular
circumstances than to adopt a principle that would open a
wide gap in the barrier against the unilateral use of force. 
9
Supporters of NATO action during the Kosovo campaign argue
that NATO's intervention in Kosovo was different from the interstate
aggression contemplated by the U.N. Charter and exemplified by actions
such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Those supporters could argue that,
"NATO['s] intervention was not 'unilateral'; it was 'collective' pursuant
to a decision by a responsible body, including three of the five permanent
members entrusted by the U.N. Charter with special responsibility to
respond to threats to international peace and security" 60 and that, "the
collective character of the organization provided safeguards against
abuse by single powerful states pursuing egoistic national interests."
61
But the assurance that humanitarian interventions by a European
rapid reaction force would be legitimate because of the "collective"
nature of the decision to act belies the very definition of the ESDP that
the Europeans have proposed. As ties within the EU strengthen, its
51 Id. at 824.
'9 Id. at 826.60 d.
61id.
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proposed military arm will behave more as a federation than as a
collection of countries. Forces operating under the ESDP will effectively
be the military arm of the super state that the French and Germans have
all but proposed. The actions of that military will be seen as the action of
Europe as a whole. The safeguard of collective action will not be much
of a safeguard under that scenario.
IV. Conclusion
The basic premise that Europe must contribute more to NATO
both economically and materially so that it may become a true partner in
the transatlantic partnership is a sound one. The EU and NATO should
work towards a fair and equitable division of labor. But, fairness and true
equality cannot be achieved through rhetoric alone. First, the European
allies, most importantly Germany, must increase their defense spending.
Improvements must be made in European mobility, logistics and
communications. It is too soon to speak so strongly of a separate
European "defense identity". Such talk only serves to alienate the ever
isolationist Americans before Europe actually has the firepower to go it
alone.
Second, unilateral intervention for humanitarian purpose is and
remains unlawful under the U.N. Charter. NATO, a collective body of
some of the most wealthy and powerful nations on earth, has the
obligation not to set a precedent that could be used by other nations as a
pretext for abusive intervention.
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